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Determination of Normal
Fire Danger
By H. I. GISBORNE
Senior Silviculturist, NQTthern Rocky Mountain Forest and Range
Experiment Station
EVERY  forest  executive  responsible  for  the  protection  o£forest  lands  is  confronted with  the  task  of  planning fire
control facilities and action adequate for his area.  These facili-
ties and actions will be greatly different in Vermont-the state
without a drought-from those required in some other parts of
the country where nearly every summer brings a two-month or
longer  drought.   In the  various  sections  o£  the  United  States
the fire control facilities and action justifiable will vary accord-
ing  to  what  might  be  called  the  normal  fire  danger  of  that
section.  As the cost of these facilities and action may vary from
a few mills to several cents per acre per year, it behooves the
forest  executive  to  plan  carefully.   I£  he  underestimates  fire
danger, he is likely to get burned out.  I£ he overestimates, and
overspends, his boss will very likely "burn him up.''
When forest fire research was first  commenced  in  1916  and
1917, the pioneer researchers,  S.  B.  Show,  J.  A.  Larsen,  C.  C.
Delavan, J. V. Hofmann, and W. B. Osborne, all drove toward
the  same  goal:    indices  of  fire  danger.    Some  selected  wind,
some  advocated  humidity  alone,  some  tried  all  the  weather
elements, but both Show and Larsen commenced investigations
of duff moisture and inflammability.  In those days no one spoke
of the "fuels" of forest fires, but when Show and Larsen meas-
ured the moisture content o£ forest duff, and tested its ignitibility
with a match, they were studying specific fuels and they were
originating  a  phase  of  research  which  is  now  being  pursued
in several sections of the country.
AT T.HE  Northern Rocky  Mountain  Forest  and  Range  Ex-perlment Station later studies of duff moisture resulted in
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the invention of the duff hygrometer for measuring the moist-
ure content o£ this fuel.  These studies also pointed to the im-
portance of other fuels such as dead branchwood, and the wood
cylinder  or  "stick''  method  of  measuring  wood  moisture  was
therefore originated.   With  duff hygrometers  and wood  cylin-
ders available,  it was found  easier to  measure  this  inflamma-
bility factor of fire danger directly rather than measure all the
important weather factors and then attempt to determine fuel
moisture by integration.
Northem Rocky Mountain Station studies o£ fire behavior
also  vindicated  the  research  pioneers  who  had  stressed  the
importance of wind.  These studies showed clearly that rate of
spread of fire varied not only with fuel moisture but also with
wind.  Consequently, fuel moisture alone could not be used as
a  dependable  index  of  fire  danger.   Wind  velocity  also  must
be  colnsidered.
Analyses of the fire records also proved that,  in the North-
ern  Rocky  Mountain  region,  lightning  must  be  included  in
the danger rating scheme.   And,  as more lookouts are needed
when  atmospheric  transparency  is  reduced  by  smoke,  dust,
mist,  and fog,  some  allowance  must be  made  for  visibility,  if
the danger index is to be used as a guide to the action that a
fire control executive must take in protecting his property.
Obviously,  no  instrument  was  needed  for  measuring  the
occurrence of lightning, but new instruments were needed for
measuring  wind  velocity   and  visibility   distance.    Standard
anemometers at $80  or more per instrument were  out of for-
esters' financial reach so the Northern Rocky Mountain Station
originated  a  cheap  device  for  measuring  wind.   Recently  a
manufacturer has been found  able  to  produce  an  even  more
accurate instrument at less than $5 each.  In the meantime the
Pacific  Northwest  Forest  and  Range  Experiment  Station  in-
vented  a  visibility  meter  and  the  Northern  Rocky  Mountain
Station followed with a similar device so that visibility distance
can be measured instead of estimated.
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of fire  danger  and  instrumental  methods  for  measuring  each
of them.  This still left to executive judgment, however, the in-
tegration of all these factors into a terminology or scale which
would  indicate  the  fire  control  action  needed.   To  solve  this
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basic problem the Northern Rocky Mountain  Station  adopted
a mechanical device used by photographers, called an exposure
meter,  and produced the  first fire  danger meter.   This  device
provided a consistent method of integrating the  essential fac-
tors of fire danger into a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7.
By this scale o£ fire danger class 1 includes all combinations
of  season,  lightning,  visibility,  fuel  moisture,  and  wind  such
that fires will not spread and no men need be employed for fire
control.  At the other extreme, class 7 includes such conditions
as  mid-July  and  August  vegetative  development,  lightning
within past two days, visibility distance restricted to less than
4 miles, fuel moistures under 5 percent,  and winds of 8 miles
an hour or more.  If fuel moistures are between 5 percent and
7 percent and the wind 25 m. p. h. or more, with other factors
as above, the day is also rated as class 7.  Under all such condi-
tions fires molt immediately controlled can be expected to "blow
up" and spread at rates of 1,500 to 2,000 acres per 7LOttr in most
of the timber types of this region.
This numerical scale of fire danger therefore offers the for-
est  executive  a  methodical  and  measured  determination  of
forest fire danger upon which he may more  dependably base
his opinion of the  "normal  danger"  to which his forest  is  ex-
posed.  Without such integrated measurements he must  guess
and take his chances of gett,ing burned out or burned up.
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years.  Other Regions have barely begun or have yet to com-
mence accumulating such data.  For Region One there are  in
fact good data for only four years, 1934 to 1937, inclusive, and
this is  clearly  inadequate for establishing  a  true  "norma1''  or
median  in  the  sense  of  the  terms  as  used  by  meteorologists.
The available data reveal a consistency, however, which is ob-
viously indicative.  Furthermore,  in this region there is a col-
loquial axiom to  the  effect that t{There  is no  such  thing  as  a
normal fire season."  Every season differs from every other in
one or more significant respects.
The consistency of the Region One data is apparent in table 1,
which shows the number of days  of each class  o£ fire  danger
during July and August, on a typical north Idaho or western
Montana National Forest.
TABLE 1.   Number of days of each class of fire danger, July and August
Class  of  danger
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As shown both by the yearly data and the averages in table 1,
the  executive  cannot  depend  upon  a  single  day  of  absolute
safety from fire during July and August in this region.  He can
normally expect only two or three days of class 2, or very low
danger.  Forty-five days or nearly 75 percent of this period will
be class 4 or class 5 danger:  average or a little higher.  He must
be prepared to build up his organization for four or five days
each July  1  to August 31  to  meet class  6  danger when  great
damage may be expected unless fires are discovered almost im-
mediately after origin, and extinguished with exceptional  dis-
patch.   Fortunately, he has a probability  of  only  3  in 1,000  of
experiencing  class  7  danger,  when  every  conceivable  precau-
tion must be taken to prevent fires from starting.
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At present in Region  One  of the  Forest  Service,  the  man-
power needed on a million-acre National Forest would be pro-
vided for each class of danger about as follows:  Class 1, no men,
class 2-4 men, class 3-12 men, class 4-82 men, class 5-128
men, class 6-220 men, class 7-22-0 men plus prayers.   When
colnditions are such that fires can spread at 1,500 to 2,000 acres
per hour, the fire control executive is in about the same position
as the football coach who has used his best punts and passes and
still has not definitely won the game;  the best that he can do
for the remainder of the game, or fire season, is to pray for a
lucky break.
It is apparent, nevertheless, that in order to benefit by me-
thodical,  dependable  planning the  executive  mt,st  know  how
his fire danger is likely to vary throughout a season.  This can
be approximated by records of number o£ fires over a period of
years,  but  such  an  approximation  has  two  basic  weaknesses.
First, the causative agencies-man and lightning-are not uni-
formly active from year to year.  Man may be persuaded to de-
crease his activities;  lightning is uncontrollable, unpredictable
except from day to day and may-actually has-overloaded a
Forest with more fires in one day than the records for the pre-
vious  10  years  had  indicated  as probable  for  a  whole  season.
Second, the causative agencies may vary their activity as they
will,  but  the  weather  may  either  increase  or  decrease  their
effectiveness.  For example, an influx of careless tourists may
result in double the number o£ campfires left burning, cigarette
snipes thrown glowing into the forest, matches carelessly flipped
without being extinguished, yet the number of man-caused fires
may, decrecLSe, SOlely because abundant and frequent rains kept
the forest fuels too wet to burn.  Consequently, the old criteria
of  number  of  fires  is  a  poor  basis  for  judging  the  fire  load.
Burned area, of course, is even less dependable because an effi-
cient  fire  control  executive  will  hold  down  his  burned  area
even during critical seasons, while an inefficient executive may
allow  a  large  acreage  to  be burned  even  in  a  season  of  only
average danger.
The results of forest fire research therefore now offer to the
forest executive accurate methods of determining current fire
danger, of judging past danger, and for estimating the normal
danger that must be known in order to provide adequate facili-
ties and manpower.
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